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Abstract
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks represent, in today’s
Internet, one of the most complex issues to address. A
session is under a DoS attack if it cannot achieve its in-
tended throughput due to the misbehavior of other sessions.
Many research studies dealt with DoS, proposing models
and/or architectures mostly based on an attack prevention
approach. Prevention techniques lead to different mod-
els, each suitable for a single type of misbehavior, but do
not guarantee the protection of a system from a more gen-
eral DoS attack. In this work we analyze the fundamental
requirements to be satisfied in order to protect hosts and
routers from any form of Distributed DoS (DDoS). Then we
propose a network signaling protocol, named Active Secu-
rity Protocol(ASP), which satisfies most of the defined re-
quirements. ASP provides an active protection from a DDoS
attack, being able to adapt its defense strategies to the cur-
rent type of violation. Protocol specification and design are
performed using an object oriented methodology: we used
Unified Modeling Language(UML) as a software descrip-
tion language.
Keywords: Network Security, Denial of Service, Sig-
naling protocols
1 Introduction
Network security relies on three major requirements [1]:
Secrecy, Integrity and Availability. Secrecy and Integrity
have so far been the subject of a number of research studies:
protocols and algorithms enabling efficient data encryption
and authentication currently exist. Availability, on the other
hand, represents quite a brand new research field, owing to
the fact that it is perceived as a hard requirement to sat-
isfy in an internetworking scenario where huge quantities
of information are exchanged. From this perspective, the
Internet appears as the killer application, due the unprece-
dented success it has been witnessing in the last few years:
the rapid growth in the number of users and the everlasting
improvements in network infrastructure are leading towards
a situation where more and more services appear [2]. This
trend clearly imposes that Internet Service Providers be able
to offer specific guarantees on the availability of the service
itself. It is under everybody’s eyes the fact that such a re-
quirement may no more be underestimated [3]. Based on
these considerations, the last few years have been charac-
terized by an increasing interest in researches targeted at
addressing the most critical issues related to the availability
of network services, among which Denial of Service defi-
nitely plays a major role.
In this paper we try to shade some light on the require-
ments that have to be satisfied in order to protect hosts and
routers from Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks. We propose
a network signaling protocol, named Active Security Proto-
col(ASP), which provides an active protection from DDoS,
being able to dynamically adapt its defense strategies to
varying violation patterns. Protocol specification and de-
sign are performed using an object oriented methodology:
we describe, in Unified Modeling Language(UML) nota-
tion, the major components involved in the communication.
Furthermore, we try to figure out some effective deployment
strategies for such a protocol, looking at the novel Active
Networks paradigm as one of the best candidates.
The paper is organized in six sections. A quick overview
of the issues related to Denial of Service is presented in sec-
tion 2. Section 3 discusses related work in this field, with
special regard to the main techniques proposed for intru-
sion detection and traceback. These two sections together
depict the landscape where our model for an active security
system has to be positioned (section 4). The focus will then
concentrate on the heart of the system itself, namely the Ac-
tive Security Protocol needed to distribute critical informa-
tion among network routers with the purpose of reacting to
DDoS attacks in a flexible and dynamic fashion (section 5).
Finally, section 6 provides some concluding remarks related
to the implementation of the protocol, together with some
information concerning our future work in this field.
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2 Denial of Service
The term Denial of Service indicates an attack explic-
itly designed to prevent a system from functioning prop-
erly, reducing as much as possible its performance. From
this perspective a DoS attack is the intentional degradation
or blocking of computer or network resources.
A more formal definition of DoS has been pro-
posed by the CERT/CC (Computer Emergency Response
Team/Coordination Center [4]), based on the security re-
quirements we mentioned in the previous section: “denial
is when computer or network services are not available for
use”. Such a definition intentionally avoids mentioning the
possible reasons behind service unavailability: this clearly
indicates how hard it is to build effective traceback tech-
niques capable of identifying the source(s) of a potential
attack.
It may be useful to look at DoS as a multi-facet problem,
where at least three different dimensions come into play [5]:
i)target of the attack, ii) type of attack, and iii) origin of the
attack.
As to the possible targets, DoS attacks may be directed
either against a whole network or a single host (this being
the most common case).
With respect to the type of the attack, a coarse grain clas-
sification refers to those techniques based on bandwidth or
system resources consumption, “fragmentation” bugs (typ-
ical of some IP implementations) and more general weak-
nesses in the design of the overall system.
Finally, an attack may be either single-source or dis-
tributed: this last case is undoubtedly the most complex to
deal with, owing to the power of its impact and to the diffi-
culties it imposes on traceback algorithms.
Based on this taxonomy, it is possible to classify all of
the most known attacks [5], both single-source (Teardrop,
Ping of Death, TCP Flooding, SYN Flooding, Smurf Attack,
E-mail Bombing and Spamming) and distributed (Trinoo,
Tribe Flood, Stacheldraht).
3 Related Work
Two are the key factors one has to take into account when
designing a system capable of reacting to DoS attacks: In-
trusion Detection and Traceback.
3.1 Intrusion Detection
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) [6] is an entity de-
voted to the detection of both non-authorized uses and mis-
uses of a system. Usually, it does not attempt to stop intru-
sion upon its detection, but rather alerts some other system
component, ad hoc designed to react to potential security
violations. From this perspective, IDSs take a crucial part
in devising reactive system defense strategies.
Many researchers have already proposed IDS models,
each differing for the nature of the monitored system and
for the detection technique adopted.
As to the monitored system, in fact, two different ap-
proaches exist, depending on whether monitoring is re-
stricted to a single system (host-based) or extended to an
entire network (network-based).
The Intrusion Detection Expert System (IDES) [7] is a
noteworthy example of a host-based system for anomaly de-
tection. It relies on a Statistical Anomaly Detector and on
an Expert System capable of inferring suspicious behaviors
based on a number of well known intrusion patterns.
The Network Security Monitor (NSM) [8], on the other
hand, is a network-based system that analyses traffic on
a LAN in order to detect possible intrusions. NSM im-
plements a quite complex hierarchical scheme, where each
layer in the stack passes information to its upper neighbor,
so to gradually build a complete view of the overall system.
The same principle applies to the Distributed Intrusion De-
tection System (DIDS) [9], in which monitoring and analy-
sis functions are distributed among Host Managers, a LAN
Manager and a Central Manager.
A novel approach is proposed by the Autonomous Agents
for Intrusion Detection (AAFID) system [10]. Here, hosts
may contain a number of agents, each monitoring a spe-
cific event; agents on a single host, on their turn, pass in-
formation to a transceiver, who is in charge of managing
all of them. Finally, transceivers communicate with a moni-
tor entity, capable of detecting intrusions involving multiple
hosts.
3.2 Traceback
IP Traceback [11] is concerned with detecting the
source(s) of a DoS attack. The most complex issue it has to
face is related to the fact that the attackers often use spoofed
IP addresses, thus preventing effective detection via a sim-
ple analysis of the IP header of the received packets. To
avoid this problem, packet marking techniques are often
employed [12].
Node Append is the easiest form of marking currently
available: every router on the path crossed by a packet adds
to it its own IP address. This clearly facilitates the trace-
back process, at the cost of a substantial overhead. Node
Sampling and Edge Sampling, on the other hand, rely on
probabilistic packet marking techniques, thus reducing the
overhead. The dark side of these two approaches resides in
the need for more complex algorithms for path reconstruc-
tion.
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4 An Active Security System
In this section we present a model for an Active Security
System (ASSYST) [13]. ASSYST is a distributed system,
involving network routers and based on a novel communi-
cation paradigm, represented by the Active Security Proto-
col (ASP). While designing this system, we tried to keep in
mind all the lessons learned from existing proposals, lever-
aging on them as much as possible, but also drawing away
from them whenever required.
We decided to adopt a monitoring mechanism based on
statistical measurements, capable of restricting its range of
intervention to those situations where actual conditions of
danger do exist. With respect to the traceback technique,
we decided to avoid use of any of the marking algorithms
mentioned, in favor of an original model relying on the ex-
changing of information, locally measured at each network
element, only upon detection of an attack.
4.1 Architecture of an ASSYST router
The deployment diagram shown in figure 1 depicts the
main components of an ASSYST-capable router, as de-
scribed in the following:
 Packet Classifier Intrusion Detection System (PCIDS),
capable of detecting an attack and identifying its main
characteristics;
 Security Reference Monitor (SRM), which stores all the
information needed by other system components;
 Policy Response Process (PRP), in charge of allocat-
ing and scheduling the queues associated to attack
sessions, depending on the particular defense strategy
adopted;
 Coordination Engine (CE) , which orchestrates the ac-
tivity of the various system components;
 Authentication Process (AP), managing authentication
procedures among the nodes involved in a session, so
to prevent unauthorized access and possible disruption
of the system’s data structures;
 Active Security Process, enabling interaction with the
Active Security Protocol;
 Routing Process (RP), representing the local routing
module of he system
<<Active Security Protocol>>
<<Active Security Protocol>>
Router
ASSYST
Router
ASSYST
Router ASS
<<TCP/IP>>
<<TCP/IP>>
PCIDS
Security 
Reference 
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Figure 1. Architecture of an ASSYST router.
4.2 Attack sessions
An attack session is identified by the pair
(IDSession, TrafficDescriptor), where
IDSession is a unique identifier for the session and
TrafficDescriptor represents the minimum set of informa-
tion required in order to describe the characteristics of the
attack. This last data structure enables the PCIDS module
to recognize each known attack pattern. It is extensible,
so to let the system adapt to new kinds of attacks in a
flexible way. Our TrafficDescriptor gets inspiration from
the IETF Intrusion Detection Message Exchange Format
(IDMEF) [14] proposed standard.
Three are the main classes that build the TrafficDescrip-
tor, relating, respectively, to the source, the target and the
characteristics of an attack (this being an extensible list of
parameters, each enabling detection of a specific facet of the
attack itself).
5 The Active Security Protocol
One of the most important objectives of the ASP proto-
col is to facilitate cooperation among routers involved in an
attack process. To the purpose, it provides a set of mes-
sages enabling communication among routers upon attack
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recognition, so to propagate the characteristics of the suspi-
cious session and of the adopted defense strategies. Router
communication is performed by means of the messages de-
scribed in table 1.
N. Message Name Description
1 ALERT This message represents a notification to
the routers involved in an attack attempt.
2 REQUESTSESSION All the routers which received an
ALERT ask for registration of the recog-
nized attack session.
3 CONFIRMSESSION It contains the flow specification and is
transmitted by the node that detected the
attack.
4 NOPATH This message contains the ID
(IDsession) of the attack ses-
sion. It is sent by routers not directly
involved in the attack.
5 ERRORLOCATIONSOURCE The router in charge of notifying pack-
ets belonging to an attack flow, sends this
message when this flow ends.
6 ATTACKEND The end of an attack is confirmed by this
message.
7 ATTACKPERSISTENT A router that has received an
Error Location Source mes-
sage, sends this message in case the
attack flow resumes.
8 MERGINGMSG This message contains updated informa-
tion about the current attack.
9 REQUESTPATH Thanks to this message a router is able to
know the entire attack path.
10 FILTERFLOW By sending this message, a router asks
the destination to stop forwarding pack-
ets belonging to an attack with a speci-
fied IDsession.
11 AUTHENTICATIONMSG Contains the information needed to per-
form the authentication process.
12 PATHCONFIGURATION This message discovers non-ASP routers
along an attack path.
Table 1. ASP protocol messages
Each ASP message is composed of an header and a pay-
load. In the following we briefly present the semantics of
the header’s fields:
Vers: 4 bits
Protocol version;
Flags: 4 bits
reserved for future enhancements;
Msg Type: 8 bits
Indicates the message type. As mentioned, the defined
messages are: Alert(1), RequestSession(2),
ConfirmMessage(3), NoPath(4),
ErrorLocationSource(5), AttackEnd(6),
AttackPersistent(7),
MergingMsg(8), RequestPath(9),
FilterFlow(10), AuthenticationMsg(11),
PathConfiguration(12).
ASP Checksum: 16 bits
contains the checksum, computed on the entire mes-
sage;
Msg Priority: 4 bits
Indicates the message priority;
IP Type: 4 bits
Indicates the IP protocol version;
ASP Lenght: 16 bits
Contains the total length of the header in bytes;
Each ASP message has to satisfy a number of syntax
rules. We defined such rules using the Backus-Naur no-
tation, as in the following:
<Alert Message> ::= <Header ASP>
<Session> <COUNT_HOP>
<Session> ::= <ID_SESSION> <TrafficDescriptor>
<RequestSession Message>::= <Header ASP>
<ID_SESSION>
<ConfirmMessage>::= <Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<TrafficShapeSpec>
<NoPath Message>::= <Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<Error_Location_Source>::= <Header ASP>
<ID_SESSION>
<AttackEnd Message>::=<Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<AttackPersistent>::= <Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<MergingMsg>::= <Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<COUNT_HOP> <TrafficShapeSpec>
<Authentication Message>::= <Header ASP>
<ID_SESSION> <AUTH_INFO>
<PathConfiguration>::=<Header ASP> <ID_SESSION>
<AddressIP> <TTLasp>
<AUTH_INFO>
We initially present the protocol behavior under the fol-
lowing simplifying assumptions: i) each DDoS attack has
one target host, ii) the attacker does not implement any Ad-
dress Spoofing mechanisms, and iii)each router along the
path supports the ASP protocol.
Once the PCIDS has detected a suspicious ses-
sion, it creates an alert event and notifies it to the
Coordination Engine (CE) along with the associ-
ated TrafficDescriptor. In order to start the trace-
back process, the CE creates an Active Session. Then, it asks
the Security Aware Traffic Control (SATC)
to allocate a queue for storing packets belonging to the sus-
picious session and instantiate the most appropriate filter
for handling them. In the following, we will call source
router the router which detects and notifies an attack ses-
sion and destination router the one which receives this noti-
fication. Once an authentication process among routers has
been performed, communication can start. The first router
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which has detected a suspicious session sends an Alert
message to all neighboring nodes. This message also con-
tains the identifier of the created session and the associated
TrafficDescriptor. Furthermore, being the router
the first which detects the attack, it subscribes itself as last
router along the path and communicates this information to
all of its neighbors. Upon reception of the Alert mes-
sage, routers execute a monitor process aiming at verify-
ing whether the session matches both the detected pattern
and the received TrafficDescriptor. To the purpose,
the CE instantiates a waiting session using the information
received with the Alert message. The monitor process
lasts for a predefined time interval (Alert Interval), after
which, if the router did not detect any packet belonging to
the attack session, a NoPath message is sent to the source
router. This happens when the router in question does not
reside along the attack path; such a router, anyhow, keeps
on monitoring the session in order to detect potential at-
tack path variations. Those routers that are on the attack
path, on the other hand, send a RequestSession mes-
sage to the source router, registering themselves to the an-
nounced session. By doing this, each router will be aware of
which nodes are involved in the attack. Upon reception of a
RequestSession message, the router performs the fol-
lowing tasks: i) labels the received session as entrusted; ii)
sends a ConfirmSession message to the source router,
requiring the TrafficShapeSpec structure needed for
activating the most appropriate defense strategy; iii) re-
leases resources allocated by the Monitor process, since
monitoring will be performed by the upstream router along
the path.
In order to better understand how the ASP implements
a traceback process, we show an example in figure 2. We
assume that router R1 is the first which detects the attack
session. When all the routers are done with the message
exchanging phase, router R7 receives an Alert message.
R7 fails to contact any upstream node, thus it recognizes
itself as the first node along the attack path. It can now
detect the attacker’s identity by analyzing the source IP ad-
dress of the packets it receives. As you can see, ASP is a
pure networking protocol, in the sense it does implement a
router-to-router communication paradigm, not involving at
all the end-systems.
5.1 Attack path variation
When an attacker recognizes that the security system has
detected his/her attack, he/she can try to modify the attack
path in order to evade the defense strategy adopted by the
system. In this case the modified attack involves routers
which have been alerted previously. In fact, routers that
were not involved in the attack, anyhow received an Alert
message. Therefore, they are still able to detect the attack
Attacker
Target
R1
R6
R5
R7
R3
R2
1.Alert
2.NoPath
1.Alert 2.RS/CS
3.Alert 4.RS/CS
5.Alert 6.RS/CS
5.Alert
6.RS/CS
RS – Request_Session
CS – Confirm_Session
Figure 2. ASP traceback process.
session, since they created a waiting session associated with
the attack. Thanks to this strategy, the alerted router can
send a RequestSession to its sources, thus registering
itself as the previous node. This causes the current wait-
ing session to automatically switch to a new active session.
From now on, the same process applies: the source node
sends a ConfirmSession containing all the information
needed to activate the most appropriate defense strategy.
5.2 End of an Attack
When an attack is over, all the allocated resources must
be released. To the purpose, the ASP protocol provides
three messages:
1. ErrorLocationSource, generated by the node
which has detected the end of the attack. It is sent to
all routers along the path to inform them that no more
packets, belonging to the attack flows, are being de-
tected;
2. AttackEnd, is an acknowledgement of the
ErrorLocationSource message. It repre-
sents a confirmation that no more attack flows are
active and it frees the allocated resources;
3. AttackPersistent. It can be generated by any
router along the path, which has previously received
an ErrorLocationSourcemessage, in case it de-
tects an attack path variation. This message enforces
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resumption of the Monitor process on all the routers
along the attack path.
5.3 Alternative scenarios
In this subsection we consider those scenarios where the
simplifying assumptions we made do not hold anymore.
Firstly, if the attacker utilizes an address spoofing mecha-
nism, hiding its source IP address, the best thing we can
do is identifying the first router on the attack path, so to
filter malicious flows as soon as possible inside the net-
work. ASP, not relying at all on the source address field
of the suspicious packets, enables this process. Further-
more, ASP is able to work properly even in the case where
some of the routers do not support it. In the presence of
an edge-backbone-edge network infrastructure (which is the
most common nowadays, especially since the introduction
of the IETF Diffserv model), just two ASP-capable edge
routers are enough to let the protocol do its job, thanks to
the PathConfiguration message, a sort of probe en-
abling ASP-routers discovery along the path.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper we presented a novel approach to deal with
DDoS attacks in the Internet. Starting from an analysis of
the most relevant achievements that have come to the sur-
face so far, we designed a model for an Active Security
System, comprising a number of elements which cooper-
ate in order to react in the best way to a wide range of at-
tacks. ASP clearly departs from all of the existing solutions,
since it introduces a novel, network-centric, communication
paradigm involving routers and enabling effective network
protection even in those cases where the IP addresses of the
attackers are spoofed.
We do know that implementation and deployment of new
router models are among the most ambitious and challeng-
ing goals for people who make research in the field of net-
working. This is in part due to the fact that they require a
number of non trivial changes in the infrastructure of the
overall network. To circumvent this issue, we provided our
model with the capability of functioning properly even in
the presence of non ASP-capable routers, thus enabling in-
cremental deployment of the protocol itself.
We are currently implementing the ASP protocol, to-
gether with the other components of the ASSYST system,
using the Openet [15] programmable networking platform.
Openet is a service-based internetworking infrastructure en-
abling network device programmability. It exploits a Java
runtime environment that allows for dynamic download-
ing, customization and activation of network services. We
are already done with the implementation of the main data
structures defined and we are currently concentrating on the
core functionality of the protocol engine.
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